Do Lawyers Ever Rip Off Their Clients? Don’t Ask Paul Harrell!
The tort reform amendment that Arkansas voters will consider next November has been the subject of some awfully strange criticisms. One such criticism was recently made by radio talker Paul Harrell, who explained that one reason he opposed the amendment was because “I don’t think attorneys should have the government tell them how much money is too much money — because that’s just wrong.” Harrell has explained that he is opposed to tort reform because it “limits how much attorneys can make.” Such statements misunderstand tort reform — under tort reform, attorneys will be allowed, as ever, to make as much money as they can. I think what Harrell is talking about is the amendment’s regulation of contingency fees — under the proposed tort reform amendment, lawyers will no longer be able to collect contingency fees greater than one-third of the recovery that they produce. (So, for instance, if an attorney brought home $90,000 for a client, the lawyer would be able to keep no more than $30,000 in compensation.)
There are, of course, other Arkansans who argue that the state shouldn’t put any particular limits on contingency fees. However, most of those other Arkansans are trial lawyers — who typically argue that attorneys have a duty to look out for their clients’ best interests, so of course it’s absurd to think that attorneys could act in a way that would be detrimental to their clients.
That may be a nice theory, but it doesn’t always work that way in real life. Attorneys are supposed to represent clients, but — like the rest of us — sometimes they pay lots of attention to their own interests. Even though attorneys are required to further the interests of their clients, they may be tempted to act in a way that brings more benefits to them than to the clients they represent.
We all know that attorneys sometimes do a sub-par job of representing their clients. Here’s an example, starring liberal Little Rock trial attorney Matt Campbell — the creator of the infamous Blue Hog Report.
Matt Campbell recently signed off on a class action settlement with Facebook. Matt’s chief job, as the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit, is to help his fellow lawyers create a settlement that treats every class member fairly — for which, in return, he’ll collect a cool $10,000 paycheck. I think that just about anyone who examines this settlement will conclude that Campbell failed to do his job. I’ve summarized some of the issues with this settlement below: they illustrate, in my opinion, that this settlement serves the interests of trial attorneys, not their clients.
The theory of this class action is that Facebook wrongfully kept track of the names of websites that Facebook users sent to each other via Facebook Messenger. The terms of the settlement require Facebook to provide a $3.8 million payment to the class attorneys — and to provide 22 additional words on Facebook’s “Help Center” page for Facebook users. In a class action suit, clients are supposed to receive the largest part of the settlement. (Speaking generally, the benchmark under local law is that clients are supposed to get around 75% of the benefit from a class action, while their lawyers are supposed to get around 25%.) In this case, it seems that 100% of the benefit went to the attorneys — that is, unless you assign any value to 22 added words on Facebook’s Help Center page. As a Facebook user, I do not.
In addition, settlements are supposed to compensate people based on the harm done to them. In this case, the alleged value of the settlement consisted entirely of a promise to treat Facebook users better in the future. It provides no compensation to the Facebook users who were allegedly harmed by the company’s past actions — which, of course, was the entire justification for the suit. Instead, it provides compensation solely to the attorneys who brought the case.
The lawyers also tried take credit for some policy changes made by Facebook — even though the company had already committed to most of these reforms before the lawsuit had ever been filed. In reality, these lawyers demand $3.8 million for bringing a case that delivers no compensation to their clients — but merely allows Facebook to jettison any liability in exchange for writing a check to a couple of lawyers and publishing a 22-word explanation that very few people will read. (After all, when was the last time that you looked at Facebook’s Help Center page?)
Class action settlements require reasonable methods to be taken to notify members of the class. Sadly, this is another respect in which the settlement that Campbell approved was defective. Here is a riddle for you: if you were in charge of Facebook and wanted to notify Facebook Messenger users about a pending settlement involving Facebook Messenger, what would you say is a reasonable way to notify them? In this case, it seems like a Facebook message is the way to go, since all of the clients were Facebook Messenger users. That is, this would be sensible if attorneys had the best interests of their clients at heart. Instead, the settlement notice consists of documents posted on two law firms’ websites, one of which is not accessible by Internet search engine.
In short, this is a settlement that seems to demonstrate two propositions: first, sometimes lawyers take too high a percentage in contingency fees; second, some contingency fees need to be regulated to protect the consumer. This is a settlement in which, arguably, 100% of the benefits go to the lawyers. It raises the question of whether lawyers were acting in their own interests or in the interests of their clients. Considering who received $3.8 million (and who received 22 words on a website), the answer to this question seems pretty clear to me.
Arkansas law recognizes the dangerous consequences of contingency fees in other contexts. Lobbyists can’t be paid on a contingency basis, for instance. Lawyers can’t be paid on contingency in criminal cases or in cases involving child custody. There is also a long-standing recognition that doctors can’t be paid through a contingency fee arrangement. In all of these cases, because of the unique nature of the work being done, we recognize that paying someone only if they achieve a desired result would give them incentives that could be detrimental to the client — and, more generally, to the public.
Even lawyers recognize this, or at least they should. The Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct only permit “reasonable” contingency fees. The drafters of these rules understood that there ought to be some boundaries on the level of fees that lawyers may charge. Every contingency fee that is part of a class action settlement has to be independently evaluated for fariness by an independent court at a special hearing; because of the many departures from fairness in the Facebook settlement that I’ve outlined above, there is a significant chance that the court will reject the settlement that Campbell has approved.
I hope the above explains two things: why the law does disfavor certain kinds of contingency fees, and why the law should disfavor certain kinds of contingency fees. At the Advance Arkansas Institute, we are in favor of freedom of contract. However, there is an exception to freedom of contract when there’s a danger that a fiduciary agent, such as a lawyer, treats a client’s interest as inferior to his own — because those agents have an ethical responsibility to put their clients first. It looks to me like Matt Campbell is getting paid $10,000 to do no more than sign his name to a piece of paper, since I fail to see how this settlement did anything for the interests of the people he’s supposed to look out for. The settlement that Campbell signed off on is a perfect demonstration of the abuse that can exist when it comes to contingency fees — and the reason why it is appropriate for the state to regulate them. An agreement between an attorney and a client isn’t like an agreement between two equals — the client has taken the attorney into his or her confidence; the client has likely disclosed his or her economic circumstances to the attorney; the client is entitled to rely on the attorney to respect the client’s best interests. Preventing lawyers from taking (for instance) half the value of their clients’ lawsuits for themselves is a consumer protection measure that blocks self-dealing: it’s a method of enforcing ethical rules against lawyers who behave unscrupulously.
To sum up: I like freedom of contract. But it’s puzzling that some self-styled conservatives seem to think that all contracts should be honored, even those which plainly violate professional ethics — in particular, contracts that violate the fiduciary duty of agents to respect the interests of their principals. Suggesting that free markets should operate inside of fiduciary relationships is a serious misunderstanding of the way that fiduciary relationships are supposed to work. Let me repeat: The attorney-client relationship has consequences — clients believe that they can tell their attorney things in confidence, and can rely on the attorney for disinterested advice, because they have been told that the attorney will respect and advance the client’s interests. The attorney-client relationship is fundamentally different from the relationship between two businesspeople at the bargaining table; indeed, the attorney-client relationship is supposed to take certain kinds of business deals between attorneys and clients off the table. (That’s why whenever an attorney makes a business deal with a client, the attorney is required to advise the client — in writing — that it would be a good idea to get a second lawyer to look over everything to ensure that it respects the client’s interests.) An unscrupulous attorney’s departure from professional ethics shouldn’t be honored. I can understand why some trial attorneys might make the opposite argument (self-interest is a powerful motivator), but I’m surprised that Paul Harrell is along for the ride. The practice of law is highly regulated, and one reason it’s regulated is that lawyers who pay insufficient attention to the interests of their clients can easily end up with a conflict of interest. The notion that it’s impossible for lawyers to rip off their clients by means of contingency fees is a very strange idea — but it appears to be part and parcel of the idea that Paul Harrell is defending.
12 thoughts on “Do Lawyers Ever Rip Off Their Clients? Don’t Ask Paul Harrell!”
This article has an odd conclusion: “: I like freedom of contract. But it’s puzzling that some self-styled conservatives seem to think that all contracts should be honored, even those which plainly violate professional ethics — in particular, contracts that violate the fiduciary duty of agents to respect the interests of their principals.”
It’s more puzzling that Mr. Kilmer, a self styled “conservative” is using a class action example to make a case for limiting the freedom of contract in a completely different context. Courts must approve class action attorney’s fees, and the class members and non-class members can object. That is not the case with the fees the anti-freedom legislation he’s pushing, SJR8, deals with.
Those fees are the ones between the individual injured party and the attorney, and he offers no reason or example proving abuse. Moreover, he doesn’t explain why if attorney’s fees must be limited, why is only the Plaintiff’s and not the defense under SJR8? The insurer or nursing home can spend whatever they want according to the Arkansas legislature, but the injured person is capped in their fees and their recovery?
Perhaps “justice” and maybe even “conservative” is defined differently in Mr. Kilmer’s home state of Maryland, but the Arkansas legislature limiting the rights of Arkansas voters/jurors and suggesting that government knows what injured people should pay their attorneys and what their case is worth is neither justice nor conservative in most places.
Big government “conservatism” like Mr. Kilmer advocates is in many ways more insidious than the standard liberal love of big government, because it’s pretending to be something it’s not. But nanny-stateism is nanny-stateism, and SJR8 is nothing if not that.
Matt — It’s kind of weird how you have responded to one sentence in the last paragraph, but that you appear to have ignored the rest of the paragraph — and the rest of the article.
Read the very last paragraph again, and think about it this time. You are just wrong to say that he offers no reason or example proving abuse. You are also just wrong to say that SJR 8 disproportionately limits plaintiff’s fees and not defense fees. Neither lawyer’s fees are limited. It is the use of contingency contracts that is limited. I think you’re aware of this, though, because you’ve been corrected on it before.
Try to make serious arguments; I know you’re capable of it.
Speaking of serious arguments, did you actually argue that contingency fees are capped for both sides? Tell me, how would a defense lawyer get a contingency fee? Or tell me how the injured person with the average Arkansans income pays for attorneys hourly and experts and court costs after they’re grievously injured and just trying to make the house payment? Do you think the ordinary injured person is as well funded as an insurer or nursing home? Seriously?
I’m happy to take the rest of Mr. Kilmer’s article apart but again he’s talking about class actions. Which have no bearing on SJR8 really, so why in the world does he bring it up? Enlighten me if you would.
It’s almost like saying that Texas proves we need tort reform with half statistics while never mentioning Mississippi and its experience.
As I said before: you responded to one sentence in the last paragraph, but you appear to have ignored the rest of the paragraph and the rest of the article. You should go back and read it more carefully.
I appreciate that you want to change the subject, so I will just take that as a concession on your part that SJR 8 treats all parties equally. I have no idea how prevalent contingency fee contracts are on the defense side, but I doubt that (as you suggest) they are nonexistent. It is certainly not difficult to imagine that they would be useful in some contexts. I think we’d have to penetrate attorney-client privilege to have a good idea of the answer to this question.
I appreciate that you do not think that class action lawyers overpaying themselves by means of unreasonable contingency fees have no bearing on one of the problems that SJR 8 attempts to solve: namely, unreasonable contingency fees. As you may be aware, federal courts at several levels have sanctioned Arkansas class action practitioners recently – even in the face of inaction by the state Supreme Court, which writes the rules for class actions.
“so I will just take that as a concession on your part that SJR 8 treats all parties equally.”
That would require a misreading of epic proportions. Unless you can explain how the injured person who cannot work has the same ability to pay experts and the hourly fee as the nursing home and the insurer.
Do you have an example of a contingency fee for personal injury defense? Or do you just doubt it because you would like to?
“I appreciate that you do not think that class action lawyers overpaying themselves by means of unreasonable contingency fees have no bearing on one of the problems that SJR 8 attempts to solve:”
How would SJR8 attempt to solve a problem in class action suits when it does not address class action suits? Does it and I misunderstood? If not, a comparison to class action suits makes zero sense.
“As you may be aware, federal courts at several levels have sanctioned Arkansas class action practitioners recently”
I am aware. Perhaps you’re aware that the 8th Circuit, hardly a liberal court, overturned that sanction and found the judge had overstepped his authority. But the sanction was not due to the fees, so again, I’m unclear as to why you would cite that in support of your case. Your site has a tendency on this issue to make arguments that don’t seem to be related to SJR8 in order to bolster this big government “reform”.
Matt, as you may be aware, one of the virtues of SJR 8 is that it allows the legislature some procedural rulemaking capacity. As you may be aware, one of the largest abuses of Arkansas’s legal system, in the class action arena, was blocked by the U.S. Supreme Court a few years ago. See Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles (2013). In that respect, SJR 8 is ideally positioned to address some significant procedural problems with our state’s rules, which certainly include the class action system. You might benefit from reading this case and thinking about SJR 8, rather than irrelevantly lecturing me about “that sanction,” which certainly has nothing to do with what I was discussing.
“one of the virtues of SJR 8 is that it allows the legislature some procedural rulemaking capacity.”
How is that an inherent virtue, when you don’t know the rules they would propose? You seem to be taking the position that because the legislature proposes it, then it must be virtuous. Odd for a site with your stated mission.
Please share how SJR8 fixes any of the problems you believe were exposed by Knowles. That sounds rather interesting. Are you saying that you were talking about that case rather than the recent sanction of Goodson and others by Judge Holmes? I don’t believe you were, but perhaps in the future when you cite to a sanction, you’ll identify the case.
By the way, I note that Jim Hendren encouraged the various think tanks that issue legislative scorecards to reveal their donors. Will you be doing so?
A note from Dan —
“I appreciate that you are advising us on what position we’re taking. But your account of our position is incorrect. Our position is that the legislature is the proper instrument for rulemaking and policymaking in state government. Please note that we do not feel constrained to provide a citation for every proposition, but if you’re really curious, you can find language to that effect in our state Constitution.
I followed the Knowles case closely; I was interviewed about it by Arkansas Business; I predicted its outcome at the U.S. Supreme Court level exactly. I have no idea why you think your opinion about what I was talking about would possibly be of interest to anyone else, but your insinuation is rude and pointless. If you don’t believe I was talking about that case, I really couldn’t care less.”
Perhaps you missed it, but did you have an example of a contingency fee for personal injury defense? Or are you able to explain how the average Arkansan, even employed, who is injured due to negligence and can no longer work, can afford attorneys, experts, etc. like the nursing home or insurance company opposing him can? I noticed you didn’t reply to those, and I was hoping you could explain.
Also, you keep talking about class actions as I noted above. I asked you, but again maybe you missed it – does SJR8 have anything to do with class actions?
Thanks in advance.
I unfortunately do not have access to every attorney-client agreement in the universe, so I can’t really answer your first question.
I don’t think I can answer your second question, either, since it seems to be assuming several things that I don’t think are true.
As to your third question, yes: under SJR 8 the legislature will be able to pass rules that reform abuses in the class action system.
[We are declining to publish this post because it contains a mistaken statement of fact which is arguably libelous. — Eds.]
Matt, try harder to get the facts right next time. I also want to reply to your larger point — that SJR 8 increases government powers — because it seems to be clearly wrong. SJR 8 doesn’t increase government power at all. It takes a power that was held exclusively by the Supreme Court since 2000 (at least according to the Supreme Court) and balances it between the legislature and the courts. This change represents something much closer to the constitutional balance of powers in the state Constitution from 1836-2000; conservatives who believe that the legislature is the policy branch will support this change.